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This paper provides a framework for analyzing one of the most important
intangible assets in a ﬁrm: the ability to predict proﬁtable investment op-
portunities. This paper shows theoretically how to measure the accuracy of
information used to predict opportunities, and estimates the value of informa-
tion in the context of a ﬁrm’s investment decision problem. Empirical study
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1conﬁrms the theoretical results of the model: (1) prediction ability has a large
positive impact on ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts; and (2) prediction ability increases
the mean and the variance of the growth rate of a ﬁrm’s capital stock.
JEL No.: D80, E22. Keywords: prediction ability, the value of information,
investment, Tobin’s Q.
1 Introduction
The age of talent has arrived. Many companies, like Microsoft and Yahoo, have
raised their market value without having many physical assets. Instead, human
capital has become highly valued in the labor market. For example, according to
Murphy (1998), between 1992 and 1996, the median pay level for CEOs in ﬁnancial
services in the United States increased 53% to $4.6 million. The popular press
stresses the importance of intangible assets in a ﬁrm, but what is the real eﬀect of
intangible assets? In particular, suppose that a ﬁrm can predict where proﬁtable
investment opportunities exist. How much does this ability raise its market value?
This paper provides a theoretical framework addressing this question.
In this paper, prediction ability is deﬁned as the ability to observe informative
signals in order to predict the unknown proﬁtability of investment opportunities.
Hence, the notion of prediction ability is naturally linked to that of informativeness,
analyzed by Blackwell (1953). The previous empirical studies on the value of informa-
tion assume that agents will make inferences based on publicly observable variables
[O’Brien (1981) and Antonovitz and Roe (1986)]. Hence, the results of previous
research did not capture the economic value of unobserved local information, the im-
portance of which has been emphasized by Hayek (1945) and Kirzner (1973). This
paper attempts to estimate the value of information allowing for the fact that agents
2can process unobserved local information as well as publicly observable information
in the context of a ﬁrm’s investment decision problem.
How do I estimate prediction ability?: This paper shows that a ﬁrm’s prediction ability
can be estimated from the squared correlation coeﬃcient between the proﬁtability of
investment and investment when a ﬁrm is endowed with a quadratic adjustment cost
function of investment.
It is shown that the correlation can distinguish the impact of information from
that of adjustment costs. Intuitively, large adjustment costs lower not only the
covariance of proﬁtability and investment, but also the variance of investment. With
a quadratic adjustment cost function, the two eﬀects are canceled out. Hence, the
correlation succeeds in separating the impact of information from that of adjustment
costs.
I apply this intuition to Tobin’s Q type dynamic investment model, which is
established by Lucas and Prescott (1971) and Hayashi (1982). Since Tobin’s Q is
known to reﬂect the future proﬁtability of capital, the correlation between a ﬁrm’s
future Q and its current growth rate is expected to contain information about the
prediction ability of the ﬁrm. This is the feature that allows me to estimate prediction
ability at the ﬁrm level.
One technical diﬃculty is that Tobin’s Q is an endogenous variable. In order
to take into account the endogeneity of Tobin’s Q, I modify the original measure.
Then, it is shown that the squared correlation coeﬃcient times the variance ratio
of Tobin’s Q and the random shock, which is deﬁned below, can capture prediction
ability. The intuition behind the variance ratio term is that if a ﬁrm has more
accurate information, it can more aggressively change its investment decisions. This
behavior increases the variance of Tobin’s Q.
3What is the impact of prediction ability?: Using the measure of prediction ability,
the COMPUSTAT data set conﬁrms the theory: expected Tobin’s Q is an increasing
function of the prediction ability of the ﬁrm. The quantitative impact of prediction
ability is not small. Doubling prediction ability raises expected Tobin’s Q by 18 %,
which is expected to be worth 74 (1045) million dollars for median (average) ﬁrms in
1999.
In addition, the model predicts that the variance of the growth rate of capital stock
is higher when a ﬁrm’s prediction ability is large. Since the ﬁrm has better prediction,
it can change its investment decisions based on its accurate information. Moreover,
i ti sa l s os h o w nt h a ti fa ni n c r e a s ei nc a p i t a ls t o c kr e d u c e st h eﬁrm’s adjustment cost
of investment, which is implicitly assumed in Tobin’s Q type investment model, then
the ﬁrm’s prediction ability has a positive impact on the expected growth rate of
capital stock. The COMPUSTAT data set supports both results: prediction ability
increases the mean and the variance of the growth rate of capital. This evidence
supports the relevance of the model.
The organization of the paper: The next section explains intuitions using a static
investment model. Section 3 sets up an inﬁnite horizon investment model. Section
4 analyzes the model under independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random
shocks. Section 5 extends the results under an i.i.d. sequence to a Markov process
with stationary transitions. Section 6 oﬀers some empirical evidence. The last
section concludes the main results and discusses the directions for future research.
42 The Static Model1
This section develops a static investment model, which assists in understanding the
intuitions of a dynamic model. Suppose that a representative ﬁrm solves:








where A is an adjustment cost parameter, I is the amount of investment, k is capital
stock, z measures the proﬁtability of investment, s is a signal and G(z|s)i st h e
conditional distribution of z given s. Managers observe the signal s,i n f e rz and
decide how much they invest.
In order to analyze the impact of the accuracy of the signal on the expected proﬁts,
Id e ﬁne the following measure of prediction ability.
Deﬁnition 1 The basic measure of prediction ability, h,i sd e ﬁned by:

















2 dG(z|s),a n d
Gz (z) and Gs (s) are the marginal distributions of z and s, respectively.
If managers can lower the variance of z on average after observing the signal, their
prediction ability raises h. If managers can perfectly predict z,t h e nh =1 ;i ft h e
signal is useless for prediction, then h =0 .
The following theorem is easily established. As the proof is similar to the proof
o ft h e o r e m5 ,Id on o tr e p e a ti th e r e .
1Although their emphases are diﬀerent from this paper, Nelson (1961) and Takii (2003) also
establish some of the results in this section. To minimize repetition, the explanation of the static
model is brief, but readers can ﬁnd more intuitive discussions in Takii (2003).
5Theorem 1 Expected proﬁts, the variance of investment and the marginal proﬁtabil-
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Four remarks are worthy of attention. First, an information structure increases
the expected proﬁt if and only if it raises h. Hence, if an information structure is more
informative than others in the sense of Blackwell (1953), it raises prediction ability,
h, though the opposite direction is not true. Second, prediction ability increases
the variance of investment. The managers who can accurately predict opportunities
have an incentive to change their investment decisions based on their information.
This behavior increases the variance of investment. Third, h increases the marginal
proﬁtability of the capital stock. Note that adjustment costs are decreasing in the
capital stock. The small adjustment cost means that managers have a large amount
of discretion. The beneﬁt from large amounts of discretion would be larger when
the manager’s decisions are correct. Hence, the marginal productivity of the capital
stock increases in h. This is why prediction ability can increase the expected growth
rate in the dynamic model below.
6Finally, the measure h can be estimated by the squared correlation between the
proﬁtability of investment z and investment I. Managers endowed with prediction
ability increase investment when proﬁtability is large, and reduce it when proﬁtability
is small. This behavior increases the correlation between proﬁtability and invest-
ment. Note that equation (5) does not depend on A. Hence, this measure can
distinguish the impact of information from that of adjustment costs. Intuitively,
large adjustment costs lower not only the covariance of proﬁtability and investment,
but also the variance of investment. With a quadratic adjustment cost function, the
two eﬀects are canceled out2.
3 The Dynamic Model
I extend the static model to a dynamic investment model in order to construct an
empirically operational model. All intuitions in the static model will be maintained
in the dynamic model. Moreover, it is shown that prediction ability can increase the
expected growth rate.
Environment:Assume that a production function is linear in capital stock:
yt = ztkt,





is a random shock and kt is the capital stock at date
2More generally, if the cost function is not a quadratic, it is shown that the variance of the
marginal cost of investment is high when h is large and h can be estimated by the squared correlation
between z and the marginal cost of investment. With a quadratic adjustment cost function, the
marginal cost is proportional to I. Hence, to the extent that the marginal cost is increasing in I,
the result in this paper can be considered the ﬁrst order approximation.
7t. The random shock, zt, can be thought of as the proﬁtability of the capital stock
at date t.
Assume that a manager observes a signal, st and a realized shock, zt,a td a t et,
and infers the stream of future proﬁtability, {zs}
∞
s=t+1.I d e ﬁne a vector ut =( zt,s t).
Assume that {ut} follows a Markov process with a stationary transition function
F (ut+1|ut), and let Fu (u) denote the marginal distribution of u. In reality, the econ-
omy might be non-stationary. However, as explained by Stokey and Lucas (1989),
a Markov process with stationary transitions captures a wide range of important
economic issues. In this paper, I follow Stokey and Lucas’s strategy.






where It is investment at date t,a n dA is the adjustment cost parameter. Adjustment
costs are evaluated by the investment price, which is assumed to be 1 over time to
simplify the analysis. This adjustment cost function has two properties that are
common in empirical studies of investment: it is convex in It and it exhibits constant
to return to scale in kt and It.
The Firm’s Problem:The ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem is:















It = kt+1 − kt,
(7)
where r is a constant interest rate. For simplicity, I assume that the depreciation
rate is 0. This assumption does not aﬀe c tt h er e s u l t sa ta l l .
Since the production function and adjustment cost function exhibit constant re-



























1+r if s ≥ 1, β0 =1 ,a n dgt =
kt+1−kt
kt .




















,a n dβ =
1+g
1+r. I will show that Q(u) is equivalent to Tobin’s Q.
The Maximization Conditions: Now, I present two basic equations which char-
acterize the investment decision. In order to do so, I need two technical conditions:
gt ∈ [0, α], α <r ,a n d (10)
z




The upper bound of equation (10) prevents the optimal solution from exploding. The
lower bound of equation (10) does not need to be 0, but for simplicity this is assumed.
Equation (11) guarantees that the solution is interior.
The following well known theorem simply restates the results of Lucas and Prescott
(1971) and Hayashi (1982) in this special formulation. Since the result is known, I
o m i taf o r m a lp r o o f ,w h i c hc a nb ef o u n di nT a k i i( 2 0 0 0 ) .
Theorem 2 3Suppose that equation (10) is satisﬁed. Then equation (9) has a unique
3 It is implicitly assumed that the space of u, U, is a compact Borel set, that F (u0|u)h a st h e
Feller property and that Q(·) ∈ C where C is the space of bounded measurable continuous functions





forany (u, k). (12)
Moreover, suppose that assumption (11) is also satisﬁed. Then Q(·) and the associ-





















This Q(u) is nothing more than Tobin’s average Q.4 Equation (13) is the ﬁrst
order condition, which says that investment depends on managers’ expectations about
Tobin’s Q. E q u a t i o n( 1 4 )i sd e r i v e df r o mt h eB e l l m a ne q u a t i o n ,w h i c hs h o w sh o w
Q is determined.
4T h e C a s e W h e n (zt+1,s t) is I.I.D.
Let me assume that a sequence {(zt+1,s t)} is i.i.d.. Then the transition function
is rewritten as F (ut+1|ut)=G(zt+1|st)Gs(st+1), where G(z|s) is the conditional
distribution of z given s and Gs (s) is the marginal distribution of s.I n t h i s c a s e ,
given st and zt, the managers can only predict zt+1. Hence, the basic measure of
prediction ability in the static model can be directly applied to this i.i.d. case. As
the proof is similar to the proof of theorem 5, I do not repeat it here.
4Tobin’s Q is usually deﬁned as Q# (u)= 1
1+r
R
Q(u0)dF (u0|u). That is, Q# (u)i se v a l u a t e d
before the random shock is realized; Q(u) is evaluated after the shock is realized. This deﬁnition
allows me to explicitly examine the impact of expectation. Readers can also refer to Ueda and
Yoshikawa (1986), who show that investment is positively related to the expectation of future Tobin’s
Q rather than current Tobin’s Q when there are time-to-build or delivery lags.
10Theorem 3 Suppose {(zt+1,s t)} is an i.i.d. sequence. The present value of expected
proﬁts, the variance of the growth rate, and the expected growth rate are increasing
in h :
ZZ
V (z, s, k0)dGz (z)Gs (s)=Q
ek0, (15)
Q
e =( 1+r)[Ar +1 ]−
q
(1 + r)
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Q(z, s)dGz (z)Gs (s),a n dge =
R
g(st)dGs (s). Moreover, predic-
tion ability can be estimated by:
h =( ρzg)








Theorem 3 shows that every result in the static model is maintained in the dynamic
model: an information structure increases the present value of the expected proﬁti f
and only if it raises h, h increases the variance of investment, and h can be estimated
by the squared correlation between z and g.
The main diﬀerence is equation (16): prediction ability has a positive impact on
the expected growth rate. Current investment not only increases future proﬁts but
also reduces future adjustment costs. Since ﬂexibility increases the value of infor-
mation, a superior manager has more incentive to invest today in order to establish
a ﬂexible position in the future.
115T h e C a s e W h e n ut is a Markov Process
The generalized measure of prediction ability: If a random process {ut} follows
a Markov process with stationary transitions, then predicting next period proﬁtability
is not enough to make investment decisions. Managers must predict the whole
path of future proﬁtability. Since Theorem 2 suggests that the entire path of future
proﬁtability is captured by only one variable, Tobin’s Q, it is natural to deﬁne a
measure of the ability to predict Tobin’s Q in a fashion similar to the way I deﬁne
h.
One diﬃculty arises from the fact that Tobin’s Q is an endogenous variable. A
signal not only helps predicting Tobin’s Q,b u ta l s oa ﬀects its movement. In order
to take care of this problem, I need one more deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2 The benchmark Q, Q∗ (z), is deﬁn e db yt h eQ(u) that solves equation
(9) along with technical conditions (10) and (11) without observing any signal. That
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Using this benchmark Q,Ic a nd e ﬁne the generalized measure of prediction ability:













































The crucial diﬀerence between this and the previous measure is that here I use
the unconditional variance of the benchmark Q instead of the observable Q as an
adjustment factor. The reason for this is that Tobin’s Q is an endogenous variable
and the unconditional variance of the observable Q already reﬂects the eﬀect of the
signal. In order to separate the eﬀect of the signal from the adjustment factor, I use




is not 1, but σ2
Q/σ2







T h ei d e n t i t yo fhQ and h: Iw a n tt os h o wt h a thQ is a natural extension of h.T h e
proof is established in Appendix 1.
Theorem 4 If the random sequence {(zt+1,s t)} is i.i.d., then hQ = h.
The theorem says that if the random sequence is i.i.d., the value of the two mea-
sures coincides. Hence, it is fair to say that the generalized measure is a natural
extension of the basic measure.5
5I must emphasize that this is just one possible practical treatment. In fact, I cannot claim
that the generalized measure is adjustment cost parameter free. Since Tobin’s Q is an endogenous
variable, a change in the adjustment cost parameter varies the value of the generalized measure.
Hence, I must assume that every ﬁrm has the same adjustment cost function.
13The eﬀects of prediction ability: The following theorem summarizes the main
results of this paper. The proof is established in Appendix 1.
Theorem 5 Suppose that a random shock and a signal follow a Markov process with
stationary transitions. The present value of expected proﬁts, the variance of the
growth rate and the expected growth rate are increasing in h:
Z
V (u, k0)dFu (u)=Q
ek0
Q
e =( 1+r)[Ar +1 ]−
q
(1 + r)
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The results are the same as those in the i.i.d. case, except that hQ is estimated by
the squared correlation coeﬃcient between future Tobin’s Q and the current growth
rate times the variance ratio of Tobin’s Q and the random shock, as opposed to the
I have three comments on this problem. First, empirical studies in the investment literature
usually assume that every ﬁrm has the same adjustment cost parameter (Summers 1981, Salinger and
Summers 1983, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 1988 and Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard 1994).
Second, if I assume a quadratic adjustment cost function, xt = A
2 I2
t ,t h e nIc a np r o v et h a tt h e
marginal Q does not depend on the parameter A. In this case, the generalized measure assesses
the value of information for any adjustment cost parameter A. Third, as Theorem 5 shows, it is
still true that more accurate information in the Blackwell sense has a larger value of h.
14simple correlation coeﬃcient. The variance ratio reﬂects the fact that Tobin’s Q is an
endogenous variable. Since good managers can aggressively change their investment
decisions based on their own signals, they will also change the value of Tobin’s Q.
This ratio reﬂects this eﬀect.
6 Empirical Evidence
I would like to investigate the impact of prediction ability on a ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt.
The main question is how much such ability is worth to the ﬁr m . M yt h e o r ya l s o
predicts that a ﬁrm that can predict the proﬁtability of investment frequently changes
its investment decisions and increases the ﬁrm’s average investment. I would like to
test this hypothesis as well6.
I can derive the following empirical equations by taking a Taylor approximation
in logze,l o gσ2
z and loghQ for the logarithm of equations in Theorem 5:
6For this empirical study, it is implicitly assumed that the value of hQ is known. Hence, everybody
knows the true distribution functions of z and s. In addition, it is assumed that bankruptcy does not
occur for any realization of zt and that managers act in the interest of all shareholders, which means
we can avoid the issues of adverse selection raised by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Myers and Majluf
(1984). The presence of adverse selection increases ﬁnancial costs, as shown by Fazzari, Hubbard and
Petersen (1988). Potential distortions due to a liquidity constraint are discussed below. Finally, the
random shocks include ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks and there is a cost involved in observing other managers’
investment decisions. These assumptions prevent managers from mimicking or learning from other
managers’ behavior.
15logQ
e = a1 + a2 logz
e + a3 logσ
2
z + a4 loghQ + ε,
logg
e = b1 + b2 logz
e + b3 logσ
2
z + b4 loghQ + u, (22)
logσ
2
g = c1 + c2 logσ
2
z + c3 loghQ + υ, (23)
where ai, bi and ci are parameters, and ε, u and υ are error terms. The error terms
are assumed to be normally distributed. The theory predicts that all parameters
should be positive. I am especially interested in the parameters a4, b4and c3,w h i c h
show the impact of prediction ability.
The data consist of a 40-year (1960-1999) unbalanced panel of ﬁrms from the
COMPUSTAT data base. We do not utilize the data from the 1950s because they
do not contain many samples. The choice of periods does not change the main
results. Appendix 2 shows how I construct variables Q, g and z.U s i n g t h e s e
three variables I can estimate Qe, ge, ze, σ2
z and hQ by calculating sample means,
variances and correlation coeﬃcients over time for each ﬁrm and each decade (1960-
1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989 and 1990-1999). Decadal averages are chosen to balance
two requirements: the need to construct reliable estimates and the need to increase
the number of observations in the regression. This provides panel data for my
regression analysis.
Econometric issues
Simultaneous Equation Bias and Measurement Error: Since my measure of
prediction ability is constructed using two endogenous variables - Tobin’s Q and the
growth rate of capital stock - the ordinary least square (OLS) may be subjected to
the simultaneous equation bias. In order to deal with the bias, I need instruments.
I use my estimates of each variable constructed by data from the previous decade as
16the instruments of the corresponding variables (logze,l o gσ2
z and loghQ).
The instruments are necessary for a further reason. Since the sample mean
is constructed by at most 10 observations, they may not be accurate proxies of the
expected values. Note that although the correlation coeﬃcient is a non-linear function
of the covariance and the standard error, the logarithm of estimates can separate error
terms from regressors. For example, equation (22) implies:
logQ
e = a1 + a2 logz











Note that the sample mean of z, the sample variances of z and g,a n dt h es a m p l e
covariance of Q and g are the unbiased estimators of ze, σ2
z, σ2
g and Cov(Q,g). Hence
I can assume that:
ˆ x = xu
where x is the true value of ze, σ2
z, σ2
g or Cov(Q,g), ˆ x is the unbiased estimate of x
and u is a measurement error, which is independent of x and E (u)=1 . G i v e nt h i s
assumption, the regression equation can be rewritten as:
logQ
e = a1 + a2 logz
e + a3 logσ
2
z + a4 loghQ + v,
v = ε + a2 loguz + a3 loguσz + a4 [2logucov − logug − loguσz],
where uz, uσz, ucov,a n dug are measurement errors corresponding to the estimates
of ze, σ2
z, Cov(Q,g)a n dσ2
g. Hence, I can separate error terms from regressors and
apply a common instrumental variable technique for this estimation.
Unobserved Heterogeneity: In order to control unobserved heterogeneity, three-
digit industry dummies and decade dummies are controlled in my regression. I also
conduct a ﬁxed eﬀect regression, to observe a possible bias due to unobserved hetero-
geneity at a ﬁrm level, which three-digit industry dummies fail to capture. However,
17since the ﬁxed eﬀect regression uses the deviation from the mean as independent
variables, it makes it impossible to use the previous value as instruments. Hence, I
report the results of both regressions to collect the maximum information from data.
Because some ﬁrms grow and others decline over time, some researchers have ques-
tioned whether the measure of predictive ability may be aﬀected by the heterogeneity
of a ﬁrm’s growth rate. An advantage of the measure is that a large trend does not
change its value. If all variables grow at the same rate, not only is the covariance
of Q and g large, but the variance of Q, g and z is also large. Hence, the measure
would be the same. As a result, it is unlikely that the results below are signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by the heterogeneity of the ﬁrm’s growth rate.
Results








g ( the simple correlation
between future Q and the current growth rate). My estimates of prediction ability
hQ have a mean of 18, a standard deviation of 421, and a median of 0.25. The large
standard deviation indicates the large variation of prediction ability in my sample.
Moreover, the large deviation between the mean and the median suggests that the
distribution of prediction ability may be highly skewed.
However, this result is not conﬁrmed by the simple correlation coeﬃcient: the
mean is 0.12, the standard deviation is 0.4 and the median is 0.15. This is expected
since the simple correlation lies between -1 and 1. Hence, the large variation and
skewness of the prediction ability measure is generated from the variance ratio term.
Note that the number of observations for hQ is lower than that for ρQg.C o n -
structing hQ requires a positive correlation coeﬃcient between the current growth
rate and future Tobin’s Q. But 38% of the ﬁrms in the sample do not satisfy this




mean 1.624 0.279 0.832 1.486 3217 18.22 0.119
standard deviation 1.179 0.652 70.32 26.93 4×105 421.6 0.403
median 1.282 0.234 0.009 0.487 0.033 0.253 0.154
# of observations 17688 17688 17688 17688 17688 10941 17688
Qe is expected Tobin’s Q. ge is the expected value of investment over capital stock.
ze is the expected random shock (measure of proﬁtability). σ2
z is the variance of the
random shock (measure of risk). hQ is the measure of prediction ability. ρQg is the
simple correlation between future Q and the current growth rate.
condition7. To check the robustness of the results, I also investigate the regression
using ρQg. Although this measure does not have any direct connection with the the-
ory, it has the beneﬁt of using every observation. Moreover, the simple correlation
is intuitively appealing. Hence, the simple correlation measure can also be used to
check the relevance of my arguments below.
There may be a concern that the measure of prediction ability simply reﬂects the
availability of internal funds. If a liquidity constraint is severe, a ﬁrm may not be able
to invest even if its managers know of investment opportunities. Hence, the diﬀerence
in available internal funds may aﬀect the prediction measure. This point is brieﬂy
considered. Because z is estimated by operating income over the net capital stock,
logze can be considered as a proxy of available internal funds8. There is a negative
7There are several possible reasons why this might happen. Average Q might be a noisy indicator
of investment opportunities (Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard 1994). Another possible scenario is
that many ﬁrms are still learning the potential proﬁtability. To investigate these possibilities, an
alternative model is required. This topic is left for future research.
8A similar measure is used for a proxy of available internal funds by Fazzari, Hubbard and
Petersen (1988). Although they use cash ﬂow over the capital stock as the proxy, the use of cash
19Table 2: The Eﬀect of Prediction Ability on logQe:
The dependent variable is logQe.
(a)( b)( c)( d)( e)( f)( g)( h)
OLS OLS Fixed Fixed 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS
ρQg 0.017∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.100 0.018∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.342) (0.010)
log(hQ)0 . 0 6 8 ∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.033) (0.002)
Adj − R2 0.344 0.513 0.085 0.333 . . 0.364 0.523
obs 17688 10941 17688 10941 7086 2664 7086 2664
hQ is the measure of prediction ability. ρQg is the simple correlation between future
Q and the current growth rate. Every regression equation controls the constant
term, log(ze)a n dl o g ( σ2
z), and all but the ﬁxed eﬀect regressions control the decade
dummies and the three-digit industry dummies. ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 %
level. ∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 % level. ∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the
0.5% level. The standard error is reported in parentheses.
correlation between logze and loghQ (-0.36), and no correlation between logze and
ρQg. This evidence suggests that a liquidity constraint is less likely to be a major
factor aﬀecting the measure of prediction ability.
Prediction ability raises expected Tobin’s Q: Table 2 reports the eﬀect of
prediction ability on expected Tobin’s Q. I report only the coeﬃcients of prediction
ability, but all regression equations control the constant term, log(ze)a n dl o g ( σ2
z), and
all but the ﬁxed eﬀect regressions control decade dummies and three-digit industry
dummies.
ﬂow does not change the results.
20Regression equations (a) and (b) report the results of simple regressions. Regres-
sion equation (a) uses a simple correlation and equation (b) uses the logarithm of hQ
as a regressor. Both equations show that prediction ability has a signiﬁcant positive
impact on expected Tobin’s Q.
Equations (c) and (d) report ﬁxed eﬀect regressions. Both equations show posi-
tive and signiﬁcant eﬀects. The coeﬃcient is similar to that of the simple OLS when
the simple correlation is a regressor; it drops mildly when log(hQ) is a regressor. The
interpretation of the mild reduction is diﬃcult. On the one hand, since productive
ﬁrms are likely to have high prediction ability, the unobserved productivity which
three-digit industry dummies fail to capture may cause the upper bias of the OLS
result. On the other hand, since the ﬁxed eﬀect regression increases bias due to mea-
surement errors, the coeﬃcient of the ﬁxed eﬀect regression may be underestimated.
Fortunately, the diﬀerence is not too large. Hence, the importance of the bias due
to unobserved heterogeneity at a ﬁrm level would be relatively small.
T h em o r es i g n i ﬁcant problems would be the simultaneous equation bias or mea-
surement errors. The coeﬃcients of prediction ability by the two stage least square
(2SLS) estimations [equations (e) and (f) ] are much larger than those estimated by
the OLS methods9. This indicates that the simple OLS is likely to underestimate
the impact of prediction ability. Since the number of observations for the 2SLSs
is much smaller than that of the OLS estimations, sample selection may be an al-
ternative reason that the 2SLS estimations have large coeﬃcients. I conduct the
OLS estimations using the same sample as the 2SLSs to examine this possibility, and
9When I use a simple correlation as the measure of prediction ability, it is diﬃcult to separate
error terms from regressors, and there is no theoretical proof that the instrumental variable technique
can recover true values. Hence, when the simple correlation is used, the results of two stage least
square (the 2SLS) estimations are reported only for reference.
21equations (g) and (h) report the results. The coeﬃcients of equations (g) and (h) do
not diﬀer much from those of equations (a) and (b). Hence, measurement errors or
the endogeneity of independent variables is likely to be the main problem.
Let me ask another question: how much is prediction ability worth? The coeﬃ-
cient of log(hQ) has the natural interpretation of elasticity. The 2SLS result shows
that doubling hQ increases expected Tobin’s Q by 18 %. Suppose that prediction
ability does not aﬀect the book value of capital. The nt h ep e r c e n t a g ei n c r e a s ei na
ﬁrm’s Tobin’s Q can be interpreted as the increase in the ﬁrm’s market value. That
is, doubling hQ increases the expected market value by 18 %. Since median (average)
ﬁrms were valued at 411 (5806) million dollars by the market in 1999, doubling pre-
diction ability is expected to be worth 74 (1045) million dollars for median (average)
ﬁrms in 1999.
In sum, my empirical study shows that prediction ability has a robust, positive
and signiﬁcant impact on expected Tobin’s Q, and the impact is not small.
Prediction ability raises the mean and the variance of the growth rate:
The theory also suggests that prediction ability increases the mean and the variance
of the growth rate. I would like to test this prediction by data.
Table 3 discloses the impact of prediction ability on the mean and variance of a
ﬁrm’s growth rate. Again, I report only the coeﬃcients of prediction ability, although
every regression controls the same variables as before.
The ﬁrst table reports the impact on the mean of a ﬁrm’s growth rate. All results
are positive, which is expected, and most of the results are signiﬁcant. Prediction
ability has a robust and positive impact on the expected growth rate. Again, the
coeﬃcients under the ﬁxed eﬀect regression are smaller than those of the OLS estima-
tions. Once more, the potential explanations are mixed: unobserved productivity,
22Table 3: The Impact of Prediction Ability on logge and logσ2
g:
The dependent variable is logge
(i)( j)( k)( l)( m)( n)( o)( p)
OLS OLS Fixed Fixed 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS
ρQg 0.074∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.843 0.035∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.552) (0.012)
log(hQ)0 . 0 3 2 ∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.046∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.027) (0.003)
Adj − R2 0.365 0.389 0.204 0.237 . . 0.427 0.434
obs 17688 10941 17688 10941 7086 2664 7086 2664
The dependent variable is logσ2
g
(q)( r)( s)( t)( u)( v)( w)( x)
OLS OLS Fixed Fixed 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS
ρQg 0.349∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 3.450∗ 0.200∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.034) (1.946) (0.035)
log(hQ)0 . 0 8 0 ∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.138∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.077) (0.008)
Adj − R2 0.373 0.373 0.302 0.303 . . 0.415 0.385
obs 17688 10941 17688 10941 7086 2664 7086 2664
hQ is the measure of prediction ability. ρQg is the simple correlation between future
Q and the current growth rate. All regressions control the constant term and
log(σ2
z), and all but the ﬁxed regressions control the decade dummies and the
three-digit industry dummies. Additionally, log(ze) are controlled for the
regressions on the expected growth rate. ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 % level.
∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 % level. ∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.5% level.
The standard error is reported in parentheses.
23which three-digit industry dummies fail to capture, may be positively correlated with
prediction ability, while the ﬁxed eﬀect regressions may increase the impact of mea-
surement errors. The coeﬃcients of the 2SLSs are also larger than those of the OLSs.
Comparing equations (j) and (n), the coeﬃcient increases from 0.032 to 0.046. It
appears to be a mild increase. However, note that the OLS based on the same sample
as the 2SLS has the coeﬃcient of 0.012 [equation (p)]. Hence, it seems that the si-
multaneous equation bias or measurement errors fairly underestimate the coeﬃcients
o ft h es i m p l eO L S s .
Note that every regression controls log(ze). While log(ze)i sc o n s i d e r e da sa
proxy of investment opportunities in this paper, it can also be interpreted as a proxy of
available internal funds. If the availability of internal funds is a major factor aﬀecting
the prediction measure, after controlling logze we should not expect the measure to
have any signiﬁcant impacts on the mean of a ﬁrm’s growth rate. Evidence conﬁrms
the previously stated result, that the availability of internal funds is less likely to be
the main component of hQ and ρQg.
I take 0.046 from the coeﬃcient of the 2SLS [equation (n)] for a quantitative
exercise. Since the median ﬁrm has a growth rate of 0.23, doubling prediction ability
increases the expected growth rate of the median ﬁrm by 1%. This exercise shows
the impact of prediction ability on the mean of the growth rate is small.
The second table reports the eﬀect of prediction ability on the variance of the
growth rate. All results show signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcients. It conﬁrms
the hypothesis: prediction ability increases the variance of the growth rate. The
coeﬃcients under the ﬁxed eﬀect regressions are smaller than those of the OLSs.
However, it is not clear why large unobserved productivity must increase the variance
of the growth rate. Hence, the reduction in coeﬃcients of the ﬁxed eﬀect regressions
are more likely to be due to measurement errors: the ﬁxed eﬀect regression increases a
24bias due to measurement errors. In fact, the coeﬃcients of the 2SLSs are much larger
than those of the OLSs. Both sets of evidence indicate the potential importance of the
measurement errors. The coeﬃcient of the 2SLS [equation (v)] shows that doubling
prediction ability increases the variance of the growth rate by 14%.
7 Conclusion and Extensions
This paper provides a framework for analyzing one of the most important intangible
assets in a ﬁrm: the ability to predict proﬁtable investment opportunities. My theory
and empirical study show that prediction ability has a large positive impact on a ﬁrm’s
expected proﬁts. The evidence also conﬁrms the hypothesis that prediction ability
increases the mean and the variance of the growth rate of a ﬁrm’s capital stock.
Although I provide a method for estimating the prediction ability of a ﬁrm in
this paper, obviously there are several unresolved issues. The evidence in this paper
suggests that a liquidity constraint is unlikely to be a major factor aﬀecting the mea-
sure of prediction ability. However, more detailed investigation based on a structural
model will be important. The measurement errors of investment opportunities are
another diﬃcult problem. If the production function or the adjustment cost function
do not exhibit constant returns to scale, average Q cannot be a suitable measure of
investment opportunities.
B o t ho ft h e s ep r o b l e m sm a yr e q u i r eam e a s u r et h a tc a nb ea p p l i e dt oam o r e
general adjustment cost function. Recently, Lehmann (1988), Persico (2000) and
Athey and Levin (2001) extend the analysis of Blackwell (1953) to a speciﬁcc l a s s
of utility functions. Their research suggests a new research direction for the value
of information. Empirical investigation of their conditions would be a challenging
subsequent research agenda.
25An equally important future question is how a ﬁrm can increase prediction ability.
Hiring talented managers or analysts, an increase in R&D and investing in information
technology are possible answers. I hope that ﬁnding the source of prediction ability
will increase the understanding of how a ﬁrm can increase its own intangible assets.
Appendix 1: Proofs of Theorems
P r o o fo ft h e o r e m4 : In the i.i.d.environment, zt does not include any information
with which to predict zt+1. Hence, the growth rate, g, depends only on the signal st.





























0)|s)] = Va r[E (z|s)].
The following lemma completes the proof.






Proof. Using the identity equation:
σ
2
Q = E (Va r(Q(ut+1)|ut)) + Va r(E (Q(ut+1)|ut)), (25)






26To complete the proof of Lemma 1, I need to show that σ2
Q∗ = σ2
z.T a k i n g e x p e c t a -












Combining (19) and this equation, I can calculate the unconditional variance of Q∗.
Then it is easy to see that σ2
Q∗ = σ2
z.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5 : First, I show that prediction ability positively aﬀects the
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Since g ≤ α − 1 <r ,
g







27Third, I prove the eﬀect on expected Tobin’s Q. It is derived from (13), (26) and
(27) that:
Z






=( 1 + r)[Ar +1 ]−
q
(1 + r)




∗ (u0,k 0)] = E [Q(u0)k0]=Q
ek0.
Finally, I show that the prediction measure can be estimated by the correlation.









Q(ut+1)g(ut)dF (ut+1,u t). (28)










Then subtracting (29) from (28) gives:






















The desired result is immediate.
Appendix 2: Data Constructions
28Tobin’s Q: Q(ut+1)...the market value of assets at the end of year t, divided by the
book value of assets at the end of year t,( # 6 ) t :
Q(ut+1)=
(#6)t +( # 2 5 ) t × (#199)t − (#60)t
(#6)t
where (#X)t implies COMPUSTAT number X in year t, and the market value of
assets equals the book value of assets, (#6)t, plus the market value of common equity,
(#25)t × (#199)t, less the book value of common equity, (#60)t. I assume that the
value at the beginning of period t + 1 can be estimated by the value at the end of
the previous period. A similar deﬁnition of Tobin’s Q is used by Kplan and Zingales
(1997). I also try my exercise with the diﬀerent deﬁnition of Tobin’s Q by estimating
the replacement cost of capital. Estimating replacement cost does not change my
results. If readers wish to see the result from using replacement cost, refer to Takii
(2000).
The Growth Rate: g...capital expenditures during period t,( # 1 2 8 ) t, divided by net




Random Shock: z...operating income during period t,( # 1 3 ) t, divided by net capital




In estimating g and z, it would be more consistent with the theory to use net
capital stock at the beginning of year t. However, some of the results are more
robust when I use net capital stock at the end of period t. Hence, I decided to deﬁne
the variables as explained above.
29Some details: First, for the maximum use of data, I delete only samples that have
fewer than three observations in each period. Second, in order to take a log, I delete
observations if the sample means of Q, g and z are non-positive.
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